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Feminism and the Politics of Representation: Towards a Critical and Ethical
Encounter with “Others”
By Amy Hinterberger1
Abstract
This essay begins from the position that a speaking subject in feminism occupies
a place of power and authority which requires a commitment to an ethical involvement in
the representation of ‘others’. Specifically, this essay will address feminist concerns of
speaking for others and the concerns raised by the dangers of representing across
differences of race, sexuality, gender and cultures. First, it will critique feminist claims to
political effectivity as a solution to ethical representation. Second, it will look at how
hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological positions are inconsistently
represented in feminist discussions. Lastly, it will briefly examine how differences
between ‘others’ are increasingly being represented as cultural in potentially problematic
ways. The essay will argue that feminist discussions of representation must be selfcritical, but at the same time not abandon the task of working towards an ethical
involvement with ‘others’.
Keywords: gender, representation, epistemology
Feminist researchers and theorists are implicated in both the process of speaking
for and representing others. These practices of representation are directly tied to the
production of knowledge and power and are thus ethical and political. Given this, the
politics of representation pose particularly troublesome issues for feminist theorists.
Indeed, the feminist project of transforming power relations and improving the material
conditions of people’s lives is complicated by the contradictory and difficult problems of
representing the subjectivities and identities of ‘others’. In light of this concern, this essay
examines how representational practices are tied to epistemological debates about
working toward an ethical involvement with ‘others’.
The parameters of concern within this essay are marked by my engagement with
feminist epistemology during my Master’s degree. As a student of feminist theory, I have
sought to critically interrogate how practices of representation, which feminist
epistemology has so effectively criticized and theorized, are often recuperated as the
ground to feminist claims of political efficacy. As such, this paper will seek to make
theoretical connections between three areas of feminist concern. First, it will critique the
notion that feminist claims to political effectivity provide a solution to questions of
ethical representation. Second, it will explore how feminist epistemologies reproduce
hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological positions that problematically rely on
binaries such as ‘western/non-western’. Third, it will examine how within feminist
epistemology, differences between ‘others’ are being represented as culturally
incommensurable in potentially problematic ways. By working through these three areas,
the essay will argue that a full ethical engagement with ‘others’ is a misguided approach,
1

This paper was originally written for a course on gender, epistemology and research methodology in
2004/05 during Amy Hinterberger’s MSc in Gender at the London School of Economics (LSE), Gender
Institute. Since 2006, she has begun a PhD in the Department of Sociology at the LSE.
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which needs to be displaced by a politics of representation that stresses the impossibility
of ever fully knowing ‘others’. As such, the essay will contend that feminist discussions
of representation must be continuously self-critical, but at the same time not abandon the
task of working towards an ethical involvement with ‘others’.
The recognition that there is a problem with speaking for, or representing others,
stems from two connected points. First, that a speaker’s location is epistemologically
significant and second, that certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous
(Alcoff, 1995: 100). According to Alcoff, both speaking about and speaking for others is
problematic, namely because these both engage in the act of representing others (Alcoff,
1995: 101). As such, any feminist theory which involves either ‘subject construction’ (or
‘object formation’) involves representation and therefore cannot be separated from power
inequalities. The terms ‘subject construction’ and ‘object formation’ are used by Spivak
(1988: 306). Both terms are crucial to discussions of representation because while some
feminist theory has critiqued traditional knowledge models as being of objects (Code,
1993: 39), engaging in the construction of subjectivities of ‘others’ for the purposes of
making knowledge claims is also problematic. Indeed, this is what Alcoff refers to as the
“crisis of representation” (Alcoff, 1995:100).
Yet, feminist debates on representation, which are productive of representation
themselves, reveal that the meanings and practices tied to this realm are not agreed upon
or transparent. In some cases, feminist representational practices and debates tend to
disguise the messy and complicated aspects of representation. For example, Spivak
(1999) identifies two different types of representation. These are darstellen (to represent
in the aesthetic sense) and vertreten (to represent or to speak for politically) (Spivak,
1999: 256). Spivak argues that there is a tendency in feminist identity politics to conflate
these two types of representation in order to move “beyond representation” and its
problematic aspects (Spivak, 1999: 257). Spivak’s distinction between different types of
representation, along with her insistence that these different modes of representation not
be conflated requires specific attention from feminist theorists concerned about
representing others. Indeed, Spivak’s charge requires feminist theorists to question how
their work is implicated in power relations and in the production of knowledge about
‘others’. In this respect, it is crucial that feminist theorists question how their work is
productive of representing ‘others’.
Feminist projects are dedicated to shifting, changing or revealing dominant
understandings in order to challenge power relations and improve the material conditions
for the lives of groups and individuals. However, as Alcoff argues, within these projects
practices of representation carry high stakes. It is in this vein that Alcoff argues that
“ultimately, the question of speaking for others bears crucially on the possibility of
political effectivity” (Alcoff, 1995: 102). According to Alcoff (1995: 116), political
effectivity should enable the empowerment of oppressed peoples. Alcoff’s argument
however, makes some rather hasty jumps from articulating the problems of speaking for
others to assuming that it might be ethical to speak for others so long as it is empowering.
This presupposes that one might have unmediated knowledge of who ‘oppressed people’
are and what is in their interests. I would argue that Alcoff’s argument runs the risk of
easily slipping into convenient categories of identity (such as the ‘Third World woman’),
where an ‘obviousness’ of oppression is simply assumed. Feminists however, cannot
transparently know who ‘oppressed people’ are and what will aid them simply because
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they are concerned with the politics of empowerment. Although Alcoff describes how
privileged locations bear epistemic and discursive importance in representation, she does
not indicate how one could ethically make knowledge claims about what is best for
others, or for that matter even know what is in the interests of ‘the oppressed’. Alcoff’s
claim to political effectivity has overriding epistemological and normative assumptions
that are not fleshed out, thus undermining her discussion on ethical feminist strategies of
representation.
A strategy of representational ethics cannot be sustained on a vague notion of
political effectivity, which seeks to empower ‘oppressed people’. If “source [for example
the location of the author] is only relevant to the extent that is has an impact on effect”
(Alcoff, 1995: 115), then political effectivity appears to be a shallow strategy for the
legitimate concerns raised by Alcoff in the first place. In asserting that source is only
relevant to effect, Alcoff might be arguing that using ‘the masters tools’ is an employable
strategy for destroying the ‘masters house’ (Lorde, 1984).2 And while this might be the
case, an appeal to political effectivity still leaves unanswered just who decides what
effects are desirable and empowering for others (or for themselves). As Ahmed (1998)
argues, one must not lose sight of who is defining desirable effects for whom in feminist
politics. She states, “to argue against the self-evident nature of the category of
emancipatory values…is to argue that ‘we’ need to make decisions about what values are
more emancipatory than others, as well as what may constitute ‘emancipation’” (Ahmed,
1998: 55). In this sense, representations of ‘others’ within feminist theory are implicitly
linked to normative assumptions about what effects are desirable. It is therefore crucial
that feminist strategies of representation concern themselves with how assumptions of
oppression and empowerment play out in their representations of ‘others’. Although these
representational practices might be designed to liberate the worry is that they reproduce
the problems they seek to escape.
The slippage in Alcoff’s argument between problems of representation and
assumed self-evident knowledge of empowerment or oppression highlights Spivak’s
concern as to how intellectuals construct the wills of ‘oppressed people’ with transparent
ease (Spivak, 1999: 265). I am not arguing that Alcoff herself does this, but rather that
advocating political effectivity to empower oppressed groups needs to be put under the
same scrutiny as her concerns for representation because they are inevitably linked.
Spivak powerfully exposes the problematic ways oppressed groups are constructed by
“benevolent” academics in posing her question “can the subaltern speak?” (Spivak, 1988:
271 and 1999: 269). She points to the paradoxical ways intellectuals claim to both
deconstruct the subject and to know and speak for ‘others’. In discussing and speaking
about ‘others’ (specifically the ‘subaltern woman’), Spivak argues that intellectuals place
themselves all too easily as transparent communicators of the voices of oppressed
peoples. Spivak argues that “between patriarchy and imperialism, subject-construction
and object-formation, the figure of the woman disappears, not into a pristine nothingness,
but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration of the ‘third world woman’
caught between tradition and modernization, culturalism and development”3 (Spivak,
2

For example, Alcoff refers to Spivak’s point that just because the telephone was invented by a European
upper-class male that this does not prevent it from being used as a tool for resistance (Alcoff, 1995: 115).
3
The original sentence in Spivak’s 1988 essay does not include “culturalism and development”; it is an
update for the 1999 revised essay. This addition points to the ways new discourses of the ‘3rd world
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1999: 304). Thus, the subaltern cannot speak. The representational practices of the
intellectual which serve to centralize the ‘western’ subject depend upon an unavoidable
muting of the subaltern’s intent. As a result, Spivak argues that theorists must be attentive
to their own work and how it is implicated in processes of representation.
The intellectual rendering of the subaltern as silent is not only the work of western
male theorists; it is also a problem for post-colonial, feminist and transnational theorists.
Thus Spivak warns “let us also suspend the mood of self-congratulation as saviors of
marginality” (Spivak, 1992: 204). Feminist representational practices must therefore not
assume to know, or have unmediated access to knowledge of ‘others’. Indeed, for Spivak,
due to the structure of representation, full or complete knowledge of ‘others’ is an
impossibility (Spivak, 1999: 283). Thus, ethical strategies of representing ‘others’ need to
be based on working responsibly within this framework of impossibility, not trying to
sidestep it.
Claims to political effectivity fail to provide a solution to the dilemmas of ethical
representation. However, dilemmas of ethical representation are also linked to how
feminist epistemologies reproduce hierarchies of oppression and privileged ontological
positions that problematically rely on binaries such as ‘western/non-western’. In this
sense, feminist epistemologies are implicated in legitimizing who can (and who cannot)
employ representational practices for resistance purposes. And as my argument will
demonstrate in the following paragraphs, feminist critiques of representation tend to fall
suspiciously along divisions of ‘western-white’ and ‘non-western-non-white’, potentially
reproducing these divisions.
In her critique of how “the politics of location” (Rich, 1986) has been taken up by
various feminists, Kaplan (1997) argues that feminists need to be responsible in
representing and investigating other cultures, so as to avoid the mystification and
naturalization of ‘others’. According to Kaplan, the “politics of location” get taken up as
the superficial celebration of difference and pluralism, or what she calls the “poetics of
relativism” (Kaplan, 1997: 144). In this respect, what appears to be a commitment to
global feminism easily turns out to be an act of Western imperialism. As an example,
Kaplan takes issue with Elizabeth Meese and her analysis of Rigoberta Menchu’s
testimonio4 in her effort to transcend differences between women, as well as gaps
between theory and practice (Kaplan: 1997, 147). Kaplan asserts that Meese appropriates
Menchu’s text granting ‘theory’ status to ‘activist’ intent and that this “might matter only
to those who have the social power to discriminate between critical and cultural
practices” (Kaplan, 1997: 147). In making this argument, Kaplan is highlighting the
woman’, render the subaltern silent. Humanitarian organizations such as the United Nations have created
new discourses such as reproductive health programs and micro-finance in developing nations. Parpart’s
essay on the rise of the “development expert” fleshes out the consequences of these discourses for theory
and practice (Parpart, 1995). Similarly, discourses of culturalism are increasingly prevalent in liberal
multicultural theory, which pits women’s equality in liberal states in opposition to the preservation of ‘3rd
world cultures’. Within these liberal discourses Spivak’s phrase “white men are saving brown women from
brown men” (Spivak, 1988: 297) takes on a disturbing new reality. For liberal positions see: Okin 1999,
Coleman 1996. For critiques see: Phillips 2003, Narayan 2000 and 2002.
4
Kaplan is referring to Meese’s analyses of the 1983 book I, Rigoberta Menchu which recounts the life
story of Menchu, a Guatemalan Indian women through the genre of the testimonial. Published as oral or
written autobiographical narratives (for example Menchu’s life is recounted to Elizabeth Burgos-Debray)
the testimonial genre works with hybrid authorial strategies often bringing to light accounts of social
oppression, war and violence.
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power dynamics at work in how particular acts or texts of resistance come to be
important, and for who they come to be important to.
While Kaplan is correct to highlight this process, her selective critique of Meese
becomes problematic when it is compared to other feminist strategies of representation
and knowledge production. In her critique, Kaplan argues that the “politics of location”
can either encourage resistance to hegemonic formations or become an instrument of
hegemony depending upon “who utilizes the concept in what particular context” (Kaplan,
1997: 138). Yet, using lived experience as a basis for knowledge production and
representation is central to various feminist theorists that claim to challenge dominant or
‘Western’ forms of knowledge. For example, Hill Collins argues that central to a black
feminist epistemology are the lived experiences of black women (Hill Collins, 2000:
257). As such, Hill Collins presents us with a project of using black women’s lived
experiences and turning them into theory, namely a black feminist epistemology. I would
argue however, that it is unlikely that Kaplan would level the same critique of Meese
against Hill Collins even though they engage in a similar practice of using lived
experience or ‘everyday knowledge’ as a basis for epistemology. Thus, Kaplan’s
arguments are implicated in legitimizing who can (and who cannot) use ‘the politics of
location’ for resistance purposes and her selective critiques fall suspiciously along
divisions of western/white and non-western/non-white, potentially reproducing these
divisions.
In this respect, Kaplan’s critique of how the ‘politics of location’ have been taken
up in feminist representational practices might itself be representative of an
epistemological double-standard, whereby the ‘non-Western’ racially female voice
becomes a “metaphor for the good” which unquestionably resists ‘Western’ hegemony
(Suleri, 1992: 337). Suleri’s argument that racially-encoded feminism has taken on an
“embarrassing privilege” (Suleri, 1992: 335) bears on the gaps between Meese and Hill
Collins. It bears even more so however, on the implicit hierarchies of oppression and
privileged ontological positions that play out in feminist representational practices.
Taking a somewhat blasphemous position within feminist theory, Suleri argues
that she wants to dismantle racially-encoded feminism’s (namely, post-colonial feminist
theory) iconic status (Suleri, 1992: 335). In this sense, Suleri’s critique of feminism as
‘skin deep’ (Suleri, 1992: 335) points to how representational practices in feminism
might to easily turn on conventional categories of identity which read ‘location’ off the
bodies of ‘others’ in problematic ways. Feminist theorists must therefore be attentive to
the ways their discussions of representation might reproduce the unequal power relations
and disparate speaking positions they seek to question and challenge.
A similar evaluation of feminist theory is offered by Bar On, who critiques the
notion of “epistemic privilege” (Bar On, 1993: 83). Bar On argues that the idea of
epistemic privilege (that some perspectives are more revealing than others) is ultimately
based upon giving “authority” to certain viewpoints, which ends up being a tool designed
to “silence and command obedience from the authorized voice” (Bar On, 1993: 96). From
this perspective, the authorizing of particular kinds of representational practices (such as
Kaplan’s) might be seen as antithetical to feminism because authorization is exclusionary
practice. However, this is not to argue that feminist theorists should not engage in any
authorization of knowledge. Rather, it is the process of allowing or accepting certain
kinds of authorizations that requires further critical interrogation and analysis.
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Haraway also cautions against the notion of ‘epistemic privilege’ by arguing that
seeking out the “perfect” subject of oppositional history is misguided as “subjugation is
not grounds for ontology” (Haraway, 1988: 582). Yet, in a similar vein to standpoint
theorists such as Hartsock (1983), Haraway does argue for an epistemology of location
and positioning, “where partiality is the condition of making rational knowledge claims”
(Haraway, 1988: 606). In this respect, Suleri’s argument that “lived experience as an
alternative mode of radical subjectivity only rehearses the objectification of its proper
subject” (Suleri, 1992: 339) might be simplifying standpoint theory’s complex
epistemological positioning. Unfortunately there is not space in this essay to fully do
justice to the wide-ranging debates on standpoint theory. Yet, it should be noted that
standpoint theory has powerfully challenged dominant (or positivist) notions of
objectivity and truth. This essay does not seek to represent standpoint as a simple theory
that unequivocally believes some people have privileged access to truth, but rather that
standpoint theory argues that “the process of approximating the truth is part of a
dialogical relationship among subjects who are differently situated” (Yuval-Davis and
Stoetzler, 2002: 315). Nevertheless, Suleri’s argument does point to the flawed and
contradictory ways ‘epistemic privilege’ might be granted to racially-encoded feminism.
In relation to strategies of representation then, feminist theorists need to be aware of the
ways their critiques and silences might be authorizing the ‘epistemic privilege’ of some
groups in inconsistent ways.
Given these concerns, strategies of representation must also be mindful of the
ways ‘differences’ between ‘others’ are invoked and relied upon. This is particularly
important given the increasing ‘culturalization’ of representational debates that attempt to
account for differences between and among women. Notions of culture are contested in
both the theoretical and material sense (Narayan, 2002). Thus, capturing culture is not an
easy task since it cannot be pinned down. Spivak notes that “culture is alive and always
on the run, always changeful” (Spivak, 1999: 375). Despite this slipperiness of the
‘culture’ concept it often invoked and represented as the basis of differences between
groups and individuals. For example, Schutte argues that “the question of how to
communicate with “the other” who is culturally different from oneself is one of the
greatest challenges facing North-South relations and interaction” (Schutte, 2000: 47
italics added). Schutte argues that there will always be a “residue of meaning” that will
not be overcome in cross-cultural endeavors and that this produces a level cultural
incommensurability (Schutte, 2000: 50).
I do not want to dispute the claim that there might be levels of
incommensurability between cultures that feminists need to take into account when
making normative judgments across cultures.5 Rather, I am wary of how levels of
incommensurability are consistently represented and taken up as ‘cultural’ when speaking
and talking about ‘others’. This is troubling because given the fluid and changing nature
of ‘culture’ it is unclear how cultural differences are to be identified and defined. As
5

For example, Gloria Anzaldua highlights the different meanings produced in English and Spanish cultures
through the figure of the mestiza. This figure exists on the “borderlands” between cultures and
understandings of different worlds. (Anzaldua, 1987). Anzaldua’s figure of the mestiza has offered other
theorists ways to bring together different and disparate societal frameworks. For example, Sandy Stone
uses the figure of the mestiza to articulate the meanings produced by participants in the virtual communities
of cyberspace who live both in a virtual and physical world (See: Stone, 2000: 524).
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such, simply relying on notions of incommensurability as necessarily cultural might
potentially reify a western/non-western binary rooted in the idea of radical cultural
differences which are left unchallenged and unaccounted for.
In representing ‘others’, feminist theorists need to be concerned with how they
participate in constructions of cultural differences upon which assumptions of
incommensurability are often built. Spivak asserts that there is a radical un-translatability
(or incommensurability) of the subaltern voice into dominant discourse and as such
feminist strategies of representation need to be wary of the unmediated power of assumed
‘cultural differences’. Given this, an ethics of representation must guard against
uninterrogated notions of cultural difference, which can too easily become the basis for
incommensurability. To do otherwise, risks reinforcing “cultural relativism as cultural
absolutism” where cultural differences can be easily subsumed by the ‘Western’ subject
(Didur and Heffernan, 2003: 11). As a result of this risk, I would argue that feminist
strategies of representation need to be self-critical of the selective ways ‘cultural
differences’ are employed as unquestionably incommensurable.
Feminist strategies of representation need to continue to seek out new ways for
identification and representation of ‘others’. In seeking ethical practices of representation,
feminists need to keep in place the “(im)possible perspective of the native informant” in
order to not get caught in some “identity forever” (Spivak, 1999: 352). Yet, this presents
feminist strategies of representation with a difficult and frustrating mission. As Loomba
contends, “we are interested in recovering subaltern voices because we are invested in
changing contemporary power relations” (Loomba: 1998, 243). In this respect, feminist
theorists have large investments in ‘recovering’ the voices of oppressed groups in order
to challenge dominant social (and global) structures. Yet, it is often these investments
that lead feminist theorists to seek out ‘authentic voices’ to represent oppressed groups.
But as Chow argues “the native is not the non-duped” (Chow, 1994: 140). She asserts,
“where the colonizer undresses her, the native’s nakedness stares back at him as the
defiled image of his creation and as the indifferent gaze that says, there was nothing – no
secret – to be unveiled underneath my clothes. That secret is your fantasm” (Chow, 1994:
140). If there is nothing beneath the “clothes” of the oppressed then feminist strategies of
representation must look to invent and imagine dimensions beyond the “deadlock” of
colonizer/native and western/non-western (Chow, 1994: 141).
As such, ethical representational strategies, which seek to account for power and
authority, might require a commitment to collective struggle supplemented by “the fact
that a full ethical engagement with the ‘other’ is impossible” (Ahmed, 2002: 568).
Ahmed argues that a feminist ethics of representation should not be for ‘the other’, but
rather that “ethics involves responding to the particular other in a present that carries
traces of the past, as well as opening up the future” (Ahmed, 2002: 572). In challenging
the notion that feminism should always be future-oriented, Ahmed calls into question
how feminists might re-imagine their encounters with ‘others’. Similarly, Yuval-Davis
and Stoetzler also argue that what is central to transformations and transitions in feminist
epistemologies are various processes of imagining (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002).
They state “experience, made by the senses and mediated through the faculties of the
intellect and the imagination, produces knowledge as well as imaginings…here lies
rooted the possibility and indeterminacy of (or else the ‘freedom’ to) social change”
(Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002: 320).
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The processes of imagining discussed both by Ahmed and Yuval-Davis and
Stoetzler might counter some of the problematic representational practices within
feminist epistemology and theory. As Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler suggest, “the emphasis
on the concept of imagination thus allows for an additional critical perspective on
epistemology that should be particularly relevant to feminist discussions…” (2002: 324).
For feminist strategies of representation then, a ‘critical intimacy’6 with the other which
attempts to re-imagine what the intimacy of encounters might look like is an integral part
of ethical representation. This is because “creative imagination is crucially involved in
the construction of the situated subject, the individual and, even more obviously so, the
collective subject” (Yuval-Davis and Stoetzler, 2002: 325). The notion of the
imagination, as well as the process of re-imagining ethical encounters and representations
of others, might therefore be useful within feminist epistemology to further explore how
ethical representational strategies might be created and sustained.
Indeed, feminist theorists must be attentive to how, through references to
‘liberation/oppression’, or to ‘western/non-western’, practices of representation end up
reproducing the very categories that they seek to escape. Similarly, it is crucial that
theorists are self-critical of how particular arguments are implicated in legitimizing who
can (and who cannot) employ representations of ‘others’ for resistance purposes. Despite
these challenges of representation, feminist epistemology, which is already open to
constant revision, continues to be a central space where dialogues and open critic might
strengthen ethical approaches to representing ‘others’. Focused on the currents of
historical and cultural influence, feminist theorists who are committed to theorizing
contextualized accounts of the everyday, must work towards creating spaces for a
‘critical intimacy’ with ‘others’. What this continued commitment requires, however, is
being attentive to feminist theory’s own work and the representational strategies
employed in efforts to work towards an ethical involvement with ‘others’.
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